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 CLD-259       NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 13-1597 
___________ 
 
MICHAEL ANGLIN, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
MR. WERLINGER, Warden, FCI Loretto 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 3:11-cv-00023) 
District Judge: Honorable Kim R. Gibson 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Summary Action  
Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
May 31, 2013 
 
Before:  RENDELL, JORDAN and SHWARTZ, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: June 13, 2013) 
_________ 
 
OPINION 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Michael Anglin appeals from the District Court’s dismissal of his habeas petition.  
For the following reasons, we will summarily affirm.  
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I. 
 In 1997, a jury found Michael Anglin guilty of conspiracy to defraud the United 
States, bank robbery, and firearms violations—crimes that he committed in 1996.  The 
Southern District of New York sentenced him to 140 months of imprisonment.  Anglin 
filed a motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, which the District Court denied.  Anglin 
appealed, and, in 2003, the Second Circuit affirmed.  Meanwhile, Anglin was embroiled 
in a separate criminal action in the Eastern District of New York for crimes that he 
committed in 1993.  Anglin was convicted of these crimes in 2000, and sentenced as a 
career criminal to an enhanced term of 240 months to be served consecutively to his first 
sentence.  Following an unsuccessful appeal in the Second Circuit, Anglin filed a § 2255 
motion as to his second conviction.  The Eastern District denied the motion, and, in 2005, 
the Second Circuit affirmed.  
 In January 2011, while incarcerated in Pennsylvania, Anglin filed a petition for a 
writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 in the Western District of 
Pennsylvania.  In his petition, Anglin claimed that he was not eligible for enhanced 
sentencing because the criminal conduct underlying his second conviction occurred 
before the criminal conduct underlying his first conviction.  The Magistrate Judge 
recommended that his petition be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, 
determining that he failed to show that a § 2255 motion was inadequate or ineffective to 
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test the validity of his sentence.  Despite Anglin’s objections, the District Court adopted 
the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation.  Anglin timely appealed.  
II. 
 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253(a), and we exercise 
plenary review over the District Court’s judgment.  See Vega v. United States, 493 F.3d 
310, 314 (3d Cir. 2007).  We may summarily affirm the District Court’s judgment if an 
appeal does not present a substantial question.  See I.O.P. 10.6; see also Murray v. 
Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam). 
 Anglin argues on appeal that his “actual innocence” of the enhanced sentence 
permitted him to bring a motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241—that his actual innocence 
makes the fact that he cannot bring a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 fundamentally 
unfair.  Although a motion pursuant to § 2255 is generally “the presumptive means by 
which federal prisoners can challenge their . . . sentences,” a prisoner can challenge the 
validity of his sentence under § 2241 if the remedies available under § 2255 are 
inadequate or ineffective.  Okereke v. United States, 307 F.3d 117, 120-21 (3d Cir. 
2002).  This “safety valve” exception “ensure[s] that petitioners have a fair opportunity to 
seek collateral relief . . . .”  Cradle v. United States ex rel. Miner, 290 F.3d 536, 539 (3d 
Cir. 2002) (per curiam).  Here, however, Anglin clearly had an earlier opportunity to raise 
his actual innocence claim in the § 2255 proceedings before the Second Circuit, but he 
failed to do so.  And, of course, a § 2255 motion is inadequate or ineffective “only if it 
can be shown that some limitation of scope or procedure would prevent a Section 2255 
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proceeding from affording the prisoner a full hearing and adjudication of his claim of 
wrongful detention.”  United States v. Brooks, 230 F.3d 643, 648 (3d Cir. 2000) 
(citations omitted).  Anglin did not make such a showing.     
 Anglin also argues that his § 2241 motion was permissible because it challenged 
the execution, rather than the validity, of his sentence.  Indeed, habeas petitions under     
§ 2241 can be used to challenge the execution of a sentence.  See Coady v. Vaughn, 251 
F.3d 480, 485 (3d Cir. 2001).  Unquestionably, though, Anglin attacked the validity of his 
sentence.  As he himself admitted in his habeas petition, he “is challenging the sentence 
imposed … [and] asserts that he is actually innocent of the sentence in question . . . .”  
Anglin’s complaint is with the judgment issued by the District Court, not the way in 
which his judgment of conviction was effectuated.  See Cardona v. Bledsoe, 681 F.3d 
533, 535 (3d Cir. 2012).    
 For the reasons given, the District Court properly dismissed Anglin’s petition.  
Accordingly, we will summarily affirm the judgment of the District Court.  Murray v. 
Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 248 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam); see also 3d Cir. L.A.R.; I.O.P. 
10.6.  His “motion for preliminary review for appeal” is denied.  
 
